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There is clear evidence that fairness plays a role in redistribution. Individuals want to 
compensate others for their misfortune, while they allow them to enjoy the fruits of their effort. 
Such fairness considerations have been introduced in political economy and optimal income 
tax models with a focus on income acquisition. However, actual tax-benefit systems are 
based on much more information. We introduce fairness in a tax-benefit scheme that is 
based on several characteristics. The novelty is the introduction of partial control. Each 
characteristic differs in terms of the degree of control, i.e., the extent to which it can be 
changed by exerting effort. Two testable predictions result. First, the tax rate on partially 
controllable characteristics should be lower compared to the tax rate on non-controllable 
tags. Second, the total effect of non-controllable characteristics on the post-tax outcome 
should be equal to zero. We estimate implicit tax rates for different characteristics in 26 
European countries (using EU-SILC data) and the US (using CPS data). We find a robust 
tendency in all countries to compensate more for the uncontrollable composite characteristic 
(based on sex, age and disability in our study) compared to the partially controllable one 
(based on family composition, immigration status, unemployment and education level). We 
also estimate the degree of fairness of tax-benefit schemes in different countries. Only the 
Continental countries France and Luxembourg pass the fairness test, whereas the Baltic and 
Anglo-Saxon countries (including the US) perform worst. 
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Economic models are often based on the premise that individuals are motivated only by their material
self-interest. But experiments systematically reject the pure self-interest hypothesis; see, e.g., Fehr and
Schmidt (2006) for an overview. Other considerations, like fairness, do play a role for redistribution. If
earnings are a combination of luck (drawn by nature) and e⁄ort (chosen by the agent), then fairness urges
to compensate individuals for unlucky draws by nature, while it allows individuals to enjoy the fruits of
their e⁄ort. Empirical evidence shows that (the belief about) the relative importance of e⁄ort and luck
in the determination of income systematically correlates with people￿ s preferences for redistribution. The
more (they believe that) income is determined by luck, the more redistribution is preferred; see Alesina
and Giuliano (2010) for an overview of evidence based on social survey data, Gaertner and Schokkaert
(2010) for an overview of experimental tests using structured questionnaires, and Konow (2003) for an
overview of experimental laboratory evidence.
Fairness considerations have been introduced in political economy and optimal income tax models.
Alesina et al. (2001) show that di⁄erent beliefs about the importance of luck for income acquisition can
help explain the divergence in the levels of redistribution in di⁄erent democratic societies. The political
economy models of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and BØnabou and Tirole (2006) show
that multiple equilibria can arise in such a way that stronger beliefs in the role of e⁄ort coincide with lower
levels of redistribution. Under the in￿ uence of Rawls￿(1971) seminal work, a similar notion of fairness
has been introduced in the literature on distributive justice; see, e.g., Kymlicka (2002) for an overview.
All these studies share a selective-egalitarian viewpoint: some inequalities in outcomes are justi￿able (and
should not be corrected), while others cannot be justi￿ed (and should be eliminated as much as possible).
This fairness notion has been used to re￿ne optimal income tax schemes in the (so-called) fair income tax
literature.1
Although earnings have been the main focus in the previous political economy and fair income tax
models, actual tax-bene￿t schemes are based on much more information than earnings only. Di⁄erent the-
oretical reasons have been put forward in the optimal income tax literature since Mirrlees￿(1971) seminal
contribution.2 If externalities exist, then there is a role for government to subsidize or tax these activities
￿ la Pigou (1920) to restore e¢ ciency. If there exist tags - observable, usually exogenous characteristics
that correlate with unobserved abilities or tastes - then Akerlof (1978) shows that di⁄erentiating the tax-
bene￿t system on the basis of these tags (￿ tagging￿ ) can also enhance e¢ ciency. Equity considerations
can provide another rationale to di⁄erentiate tax-bene￿t schemes. The seminal work of Mirrlees (1972)
and Boskin and Sheshinsky (1983) discuss the optimal income tax treatment of family size and couples,
respectively.
In this paper we want to derive and test a fair and e¢ cient tax-bene￿t scheme that is based on several
characteristics; and each characteristic can be di⁄erent in terms of the degree of control, i.e., the extent
to which it can be changed by exerting e⁄ort. We preview the core ingredients:
1. Fair and e¢ cient taxation. In the standard optimal income tax problem, individual heterogeneity
is usually due to unobservable di⁄erences in productivities (or types). The fair income tax literature
1See Roemer et al. (2003), Schokkaert et al. (2004), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006, 2007), Luttens and Ooghe (2007),
and Jacquet and Van de gaer (2010).
2See, e.g., SalaniØ (2003) and Mankiw et al. (2009) for overviews.
2adds unobservable di⁄erences in tastes for e⁄ort as a second, but normatively distinct, source of
heterogeneity. These taste di⁄erences make the interpersonal comparison of utilities di¢ cult and
bring the question of fairness￿ which inequalities are justi￿able and which are not￿ to the fore. To
deal with this, we follow Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) and keep individuals responsible for their
tastes, but not for their types. Two plausible fairness principles, compensation and responsibility,
result. If outcome di⁄erences between two individuals are only due to di⁄erences in their types, then
compensation approves of a transfer from the better o⁄to the worse o⁄. Responsibility demands that
the laisser-faire is selected if all individuals have the same type. Indeed, in such a case all remaining
di⁄erences in outcomes can only be due to di⁄erences in tastes for which individuals are (held)
responsible. These fairness principles, in conjunction with e¢ ciency, constitute the core properties
of a fair and e¢ cient planner.
2. Partial control. Individuals di⁄er in several characteristics, each of which we model as a weighted
combination of type (drawn by nature) and e⁄ort (chosen by the individual). We refer to this weight
as the degree of control. For some characteristics like sex, age and inborn handicaps the degree of
control is zero (i.e., these characteristic are exogenous tags fully de￿ned by the individual￿ s type),
while for other characteristics, think of education and family composition, the degree of control is
positive and thus partial control applies. The degree of control will play a crucial role in the shape
of the resulting fair and e¢ cient tax-bene￿t scheme.
3. Theory. The complexity of multidimensional screening exercises forces us to simplify some aspects
of the model to keep analytical tractability. In section 2 we set up a model, assuming a linear pro-
duction technology, quasi-linear preferences de￿ned over consumption and multidimensional e⁄ort,
independent multivariate normal distributions for types and tastes, and linear tax rates. Two testable
predictions result. First, fairness requires that the tax rate on partially controllable characteristics
should be lower compared to the tax on non-controllable characteristics. Second, the total e⁄ect of
the non-controllable characteristics on the post-tax outcome - a function of the variance-covariance
structure of the characteristics and the implicit tax rates - should be equal to zero.
4. Evidence. In section 3 we estimate and discuss the implicit tax rates for a number of characteristics
in 26 European countries (using the 2007 EU-SILC data) and the US (using the CPS data). We ￿nd
a robust tendency in all countries to compensate more for the non-controllable characteristic (a
composite based on sex, age and disability in our study) compared to the partially controllable
one (based on family composition, immigration status, unemployment and education level). We
also estimate the degree of fairness of the di⁄erent tax-bene￿t schemes: how close to zero is the
total e⁄ect of the non-controllable composite on the post-tax outcome? The Baltic States (Latvia,
Estonia and Lithuania) and the Anglo-Saxon countries (the United Kingdom, Ireland and the United
States) are least fair. Although the Northern countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and
Iceland) do better in terms of fairness, they are in turn outperformed by some Central Eastern and
Southern countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Italy) as well as by
most continental countries (France, Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium).
Among the latter, only France and Luxembourg pass the fairness test.
32 Theory
In the ￿rst part of this section, we describe the basic building blocks - production technology, individual
preferences, and the social preference of a fair and e¢ cient planner. In the second part we describe
and discuss the theoretical results, with a focus on two special cases: the ￿ Mirrlees￿ -case (one taxable
characteristic, say, earnings) and the ￿ Akerlof￿ -case (two taxable characteristics, say, earnings and an
exogenous tag).
2.1 Model
To keep things simple, the model is additive: output is linear in characteristics and characteristics are
linear in e⁄ort and type, preferences are quasi-linear in (net) output, and the welfare function will average
(a concave transformation of) utilities. The additive speci￿cation is convenient in terms of interpretation,
but note that the same theoretical results can be obtained in a multiplicative model, i.e., the model
obtained by replacing the linear speci￿cation by a log-linear one in each of the basic building blocks; see
appendix for an outline of the multiplicative variant.
Production technology. Individuals (or households) can be described by a vector x 2 RJ, with J a
￿nite set of characteristics. Although we present the model for an arbitrary number of characteristics, we
often focus on the case with one or two characteristics.3 The pre-intervention or gross outcome (think
of welfare, well-being or income) is denoted y and is assumed to be a linear function of the di⁄erent
characteristics of the individual; formally:
y = ￿0 +
P
j2J ￿jxj: (1)




j2J ￿ 0, and 0 denotes a vector of zeros of appropriate
length. Characteristics are a combination of e⁄ort e 2 RJ and type ￿ 2 RJ, i.e., for each j in J we assume
xj = ￿jej + (1 ￿ ￿j)￿j: (2)
The weights of e⁄ort￿ one weight for each characteristic￿ are collected in a vector ￿ 2 (0;1)
J. This vector
is the same for all individuals and de￿nes the ￿ degree of control￿for each characteristic in between the
extremes of no control (￿j ! 0; the characteristic is pure type) and full control (￿j ! 1; the characteristic
is pure e⁄ort). In contrast to the characteristics, e⁄ort and type are not observable to the planner (but
the multivariate type distribution is known).
Some special cases arise. First, if there is only one characteristic, say earnings x1, and assuming ￿0 = 0
and ￿1 = 1, then y = x1 = ￿1e1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1, and we obtain an additive version of what we call the
￿ Mirrlees￿ -case. Next, if there are two characteristics, individual earnings x1 = ￿1e1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 and
a tag, an exogenous characteristic denoted x2 ! ￿2 (given ￿2 ! 0) and if ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = 1, then
y = x1 + ￿2x2 ! (￿1e1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1) + ￿2￿2, and we arrive in the so-called ￿ Akerlof￿ -case. Note that the
tag x2 ! ￿2 can both correlate with the earnings ability ￿1 and a⁄ect well-being directly (via ￿2 > 0).4
3In the empirical part we will partition all characteristics into two groups such that the theory for two characteristics
applies to these two groups as a whole.
4Note also that the ￿ Boskin-Sheshinsky￿ -model for the optimal taxation of couples can be derived as a special case:
choosing ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = ￿2 = 1 we have y = x1 + x2 with x1 = ￿1e1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 and x2 = ￿2e2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2 the
earnings of the partners in a couple. We do not further discuss this case here.
4Preference technology. Individual utility is equal to the net outcome c (to be de￿ned later) minus the
cost of e⁄ort; no externalities occur. We assume:













with ￿ 2 RJ a vector of taste parameters which de￿nes the disutility of e⁄ort, and ￿ 2 RJ, with ￿ ￿ 0, a
vector controlling the degree of convexity of the cost of e⁄ort. This is a multidimensional version of the
classical quasi-linear preferences which are often used in optimal tax theory to simplify the theoretical
analysis by excluding income e⁄ects (see , e.g., Diamond, 1998). As usual, higher values for ￿ correspond
with lower disutility of e⁄ort, which can be thought of as more ambitious individuals; higher values for
￿ correspond with more elastic responses to e⁄ort and can be interpreted as the cost of taxation for the
di⁄erent characteristics. In contrast to the taste vector ￿, the elasticity vector ￿ is assumed to be the
same for all individuals.
Net outcomes and behaviour. The instruments of the social planner5 are restricted to ￿ basic income-
￿ at tax￿schemes. Although restrictive compared to non-linear tax instruments, linear schemes could be
close to optimal, at least for income taxation (see, e.g., Mankiw et al., 2009 for a discussion). In addition,
the introduction of non-income characteristics is a far more important source of non-linearity in tax-bene￿t
schemes. In the countries we analyze in the empirical part, the variation in taxes is mainly explained by
non-income characteristics (49% on average) and income (30%), while higher-order terms for income do
not play an important role (5%).6 Formally, the net outcome c satis￿es
c ￿ y ￿ t0 ￿
P
j2J tjxj; (4)
with t0 2 R controlling the overall level of the net outcome, and t 2 RJ the tax rates applied to the
di⁄erent (observable) characteristics.
Types and tastes are private information; in particular, we assume that individuals know their type
when choosing e⁄ort. However, all results would remain the same if individuals only knew the distribu-
tion of types and e⁄ort choices were modeled via expected utility maximization.7 Lemma 1 summarizes
behaviour, i.e., choice and indirect utility.












for all j in J, (5)
which results in the characteristics
x￿
j = ￿je￿










+ (1 ￿ ￿j)￿j; (6)













(1 ￿ ￿j)￿j; (7)
5Note that the ￿ction of a ￿ social planner￿is a proxy for a more complex political model; see, e.g., Coughlin (1992),
who shows equivalence between a planner with a weighted social welfare function and a probabilistic voting model with two
candidates competing for votes.
6The remaining part is either unexplained (12%) or due to covariances between the observed characteristics (4%).
7Types can thus also be interpreted as representing good or bad luck for which individuals ought to be compensated.
8We de￿ne e￿
j ! ￿1 for all tax levels tj > ￿j.
5with

















A fair and e¢ cient planner. The planner observes the multivariate type distribution F which is










j2J a vector of means and ￿ = (￿ij)ij2J2 a variance-covariance matrix with ￿jj > 0 for all
j in J and (￿ij)
2 < ￿ii￿jj for all i;j in J (excluding perfect correlation). The social planner sets taxes t0






dF (￿)dG(￿) ￿ R0; (10)
with R0 an exogenous (per-capita) revenue requirement, x￿
j de￿ned in equation (6), and the distributions
F and G de￿ned in equation (9). In order to de￿ne aggregate welfare, we assume that the planner balances
e¢ ciency and fairness. E¢ ciency is operationalized via the Pareto principle, while fairness is de￿ned as
selective egalitarianism: individuals are held responsible for their tastes, but not for their type. We discuss
e¢ ciency and fairness in an informal way in the next paragraph; see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) for
a formal discussion.10
A Pareto e¢ cient planner de￿nes welfare as an increasing function of individual well-being, and well-
being is a speci￿c cardinalization of utility de￿ned in (3). But which cardinalization is normatively in-
teresting? Fairness considerations can guide us. A selective egalitarian planner is egalitarian, but only
with respect to those outcome di⁄erences that are caused by di⁄erences in type for which individuals
are not (held) responsible. We select two plausible principles, compensation and responsibility. If two
individuals have the same tastes and make exactly the same e⁄ort choices, then any remaining outcome
di⁄erences can be traced back to di⁄erences in type, which are deemed relevant for redistribution. In
this case the compensation principle approves of progressive Pigou-Dalton transfers, i.e., mean-preserving
transfers from the richer to the poorer individual. If all individuals have the same type, then outcome
di⁄erences in the laisser-faire allocation￿ i.e., the allocation which would be chosen by individuals in the
absence of taxation￿ are only due to di⁄erences in tastes, which are deemed irrelevant for redistribution.
So, if all individuals have the same type, there is no reason to redistribute and the responsibility principle
requires that the laisser-faire allocation should result.
We de￿ne the social planner￿ s objective ￿rst, and link it back to e¢ ciency and fairness afterwards.
The social planner maximizes a Kolm-Pollak welfare function, i.e., welfare is a sum of increasing and
concave exponential functions of well-being. Well-being is de￿ned as a speci￿c cardinalization of utility.
More precisely, the (direct) well-being in a given bundle (c;e), denoted u(c;e;￿;￿0;￿;￿;￿;￿), is implicitly
de￿ned as the hypothetical type ￿
H = (u;u;:::;u) which makes an individual indi⁄erent between (1) the
actual received bundle (c;e) and (2) the bundle the individual would choose￿ with her own tastes, but
with this hypothetical type ￿
H￿ in the laisser-faire, here de￿ned as (t0;t) = (R0;0). Figure 1 illustrates
9Independence avoids the philosophical problem of whether we can hold individuals responsible for their tastes, if the
latter correlate with type.
10A similar proposal has been made by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976).









c (1 ￿ ￿1)u ￿ R0
) ￿1
the construction of direct well-being for the Mirrlees-case (with y = x1 = ￿1e1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1), obtained
by changing the intercept of the laisser-faire budget set (a budget line with intercept (1 ￿ ￿1)u￿R0 and
slope ￿1) such that it is tangent to the indi⁄erence curve through the bundle (c;e1); Lemma 2 derives the
corresponding direct well-being index formally.
Lemma 2. Given a bundle (c;e), direct well-being u is implicitly de￿ned by
U (c;e;￿;￿) = V (R0;0;￿;￿0;￿;￿;￿;(u;u;:::;u))














j2J (1 ￿ ￿j)￿j
: (11)
A social planner who maximizes a sum of increasing and concave exponential functions of well-being￿
with well-being de￿ned in Lemma 2￿ is both Pareto e¢ cient and selective egalitarian. Pareto e¢ ciency
follows from the observation that welfare is increasing in well-being and well-being is a speci￿c cardinal-
ization of utility. For the compensation principle, note that direct well-being does not depend on type ￿
such that well-being di⁄erences between individuals with the same tastes and the same e⁄ort can only be
due to di⁄erences in their net outcome c. Since welfare is a concave function of well-being and well-being
is linear in net outcome c, Pigou-Dalton transfers increase welfare. To see why the responsibility principle
holds, it is more convenient to work with the corresponding indirect well-being function, i.e., well-being
measured at the bundle chosen by an individual for a given tax-bene￿t scheme (t0;t). Lemma 3 provides
us with the indirect well-being formula.
Lemma 3. Given a tax-bene￿t scheme (t0;t), indirect well-being v is implicitly de￿ned by
V (t0;t;￿;￿0;￿;￿;￿;￿) = V (R0;0;￿;￿0;￿;￿;￿;(v;v;:::;v))
7with V the indirect utility function de￿ned in Lemma 1. This results in v (t0;t;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿) equal to










j2J (1 ￿ ￿j)￿j
: (12)
From lemma 3 it follows that if all individuals have the same type, then they all obtain the same well-being
level in the laisser faire de￿ned by (t0;t) = (R0;0). As a consequence, deviating from t = 0 would decrease




The program of the social planner is to choose a tax-bene￿t scheme (t0;t) in order to maximize welfare, a









exp[￿rv (t0;t;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿)]dF (￿)dG(￿); (13)
subject to the budget constraint (10), with r > 0 the inequality aversion parameter, R0 the exogenous
(per-capita) revenue requirement, indirect well-being v (t0;t;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿) de￿ned in lemma 3, and the
distributions F and G de￿ned in equation (9). Proposition 1 characterizes the general solution.
Proposition 1. The solution to the social planner￿ s problem is characterized as follows:
1. the budget constraint (and e¢ ciency) leads to
t￿














j2J tj (1 ￿ ￿j)￿￿
j;
which can be plugged in in the welfare function to obtain welfare as a function of
￿
t;￿;￿;￿;r;R0;￿￿;￿￿;￿￿￿
as de￿ned in the appendix;
2. maximizing the previous welfare function w.r.t. t leads to a system of ￿rst-order conditions (one for








kj + r(1 ￿ ￿j)
P




j2J (1 ￿ ￿j)￿j > 0. The solution t￿ satis￿es t￿ ￿ ￿ and is a global maximum.
Proof. See appendix.
There is little we can say in general. If the planner does not care about compensation (r ! 0) or if
compensation is an empty requirement due to type homogeneity (￿￿ ! 0), then the laisser-faire results,
i.e., (t￿
0;t￿) = (R0;0), in the optimum. In the sequel we discuss two speci￿c cases: the ￿ Mirrlees￿ -case,
in which the outcome is de￿ned by one endogenous characteristic (income), and the ￿ Akerlof￿ -case with
an endogenous and an exogenous (non-controllable) characteristic (a tag). Especially the second case will
provide us with testable hypotheses that do not depend on the (perceived) degree of control ￿ or the
inequality aversion r. This makes it particularly suitable for cross-country comparisons.
82.2.2 The ￿ Mirrlees￿ -case
To set the stage, we start with the simplest case possible. Suppose the outcome y is de￿ned by one
characteristic only, say earnings x1, with y = x1 = ￿1e1+(1 ￿ ￿1)￿1. The system of ￿rst-order conditions
in proposition 1 reduces to






11 + r(1 ￿ ￿1)
2 (1 ￿ t1)￿￿
11 = 0:
We sum up the di⁄erent theoretical results here; formal derivations can be found in the appendix. The
tax rate t￿
1 on earnings x1:
1. lies in between the extremes of no taxation and complete taxation, i.e., 0 < t￿
1 < 1;
2. decreases with the elasticity ￿1, ranging from complete Taxation, in the case of perfect inelastic
e⁄ort (t￿
1 ! 1 if ￿1 ! 0), to no taxation, in the case of perfect elastic e⁄ort (t￿
1 ! 0 if ￿1 ! +1);
3. increases with the inequality aversion r, ranging from no taxation if the planner is inequality
neutral (t￿










if r ! +1);
4. increases with type heterogeneity ￿￿
11, ranging from no taxation if everyone has the same type (t￿
1 ! 0
if ￿￿
11 ! 0) to complete taxation if types become very heterogeneous (t￿
1 ! 1 if ￿￿
11 ! +1);
5. decreases with taste heterogeneity ￿
￿
11, ranging from partial taxation if everyone has the same taste
(0 < t￿
1 < 1 if ￿
￿
11 ! 0) to zero taxation if tastes become very heterogeneous (t￿
1 ! 0 if ￿
￿
11 ! +1);
6. decreases with the degree of control ￿1, ranging from complete taxation if earnings cannot be
controlled (t￿
1 ! 1 if ￿1 ! 0) to no taxation if earnings is fully controlled (t￿
1 ! 0 if ￿1 ! 1).
The ￿rst four results are standard in the optimal tax literature (see e.g., Mankiw et al., 2009, for a
recent overview). The ￿fth result appears in Su and Judd (2006) and Weinzierl (2009), while the sixth is
new in optimal income tax models. To compare with the results in political economy models, note that




11) (see Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). The sixth result, which is new in optimal tax models,
mirrors the political economy equilibria of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and BØnabou and
Tirole (2006) where a higher belief in control coincides with a lower tax rate.
2.2.3 The ￿ Akerlof￿ -case
Suppose that there exist two characteristics, earnings x1 = ￿1e1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 and an exogenous tag








11 + r(1 ￿ ￿1)
￿
(1 ￿ t1)(1 ￿ ￿1)￿￿




(1 ￿ t1)(1 ￿ ￿1)￿￿
12 + (￿2 ￿ t2)￿￿
22 = 0;
11Besides Akerlof (1978), the theoretical use of tags in optimal taxation schemes has been analyzed by, among others,
Immonen et al. (1998) and SalaniØ (2002, 2003). While the previous authors do not have a speci￿c tag in mind, for instance,
Blomquist and Micheletto (2008) and Weinzierl (2010) consider age tags, Mankiw and Weinzierl (2008) study height, and
Alesina et al. (2008) and Cremer et al. (2010) focus on gender.
9with ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿1) + ￿2 here. The complete comparative statics results can be found in the appendix.
Here we highlight that the tax rate on earnings t￿
1 also satis￿es points 1-6 as described in the previous








rate on earnings t￿
1 reduces to zero and all taxation can be done via the tax t￿
2 on the tag, since the latter
is a perfect signal of earnings ability and it can be taxed at no cost.
More interesting for our purposes is that the second of the ￿rst-order conditions can be rewritten as
(￿2 ￿ t2) + (￿￿
12=￿￿
22) ￿ (1 ￿ t1)(1 ￿ ￿1) = 0: (14)
Two special cases are immediately clear from equation (14). In the absence of a needs e⁄ect of the
tag (￿2 ! 0), the optimal tax on the tag reduces to t2 = (￿￿
12=￿￿
22)(1 ￿ t1)(1 ￿ ￿1), which is positive
(negative) if the tag signals a higher (lower) ability to earn. In the absence of a signal (￿￿
12 = 0), the
optimal tax on tag t2 equals ￿2, i.e., the gross e⁄ect of the tag should be taxed away. More generally,
equation (14) tells us that the total marginal e⁄ect of the tag ￿2 on the net outcome c should be equal to
zero in a fair tax-bene￿t system. To see this, note that the total net marginal e⁄ect consists of two parts.
The ￿rst part (￿2 ￿ t2) is the direct marginal e⁄ect of ￿2 on the net outcome c. The second part can be
interpreted as the indirect marginal e⁄ect of ￿2 on c: it is equal to ￿￿
12=￿￿
22, the marginal e⁄ect of ￿2 on
￿1,13 multiplied by (1 ￿ t1)(1 ￿ ￿1), the marginal e⁄ect of ￿1 on c.
To test equation (14), we must be able to rewrite it in terms of empirically observable quantities.
Fortunately, we can use lemma 1 to see that
x￿
1 = ￿1￿1 (ln((￿1 ￿ t1)￿1) + ￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1;
x￿
2 = ￿2;
which implies that ￿x
￿




22. Using these formulas, we obtain the empirical
counterpart of the theoretical formula (14):




22) ￿ (1 ￿ t1) = 0: (15)
Note that neither the degree of control ￿1 nor the inequality aversion r have to be observed to test it.
3 Evidence
3.1 Model
Before setting up the empirical model, we start with two remarks. First, we make a distinction between
covariates and characteristics: a characteristic can consist of several covariates, but not vice-versa. We
provide two examples. The covariates for the characteristic ￿ education￿are the di⁄erent education dummies.
The covariates for the characteristic ￿ no control￿will consist of all covariates of the characteristics which
are deemed beyond individual control (we use age, sex and disability later on). The last example illustrates
that it is possible to create two composite characteristics, ￿ partial control￿and ￿ no control￿ , out of a ￿nite
set of covariates. Such a partitioning will allow us to test the theoretical predictions of the ￿ Akerlof￿ -case
in equation (15) later on. Second, an error term is inevitable in empirical work. It will play the role of an
12Except for a di⁄erent limit if the inequality aversion r becomes large (r ! +1)
13Note that ￿￿
12=￿￿
22 is the OLS-estimate when regressing ￿2 on ￿1.
10additional ￿ unobserved￿characteristic in the sequel. Since the error term is by assumption independent of
the other covariates, adding it in the theoretical model as a third independent characteristic would not
have changed the theoretical results.
Let z denote a vector of covariates, which can be decomposed as z = (zj)j2J, with zj the covariates
for characteristic j in J. Let ￿ ￿￿denotes a vector product; the gross output regression can be written as
y = w0 + w ￿ z + ￿ (16)
= w0 +
P
j2J wj ￿ zj + ￿
￿ ￿0 + ￿ ￿ x;
which brings us back to the theoretical model, de￿ning ￿0 ￿ w0, ￿ ￿ 1 (a vector of ones) and x ￿
((wj ￿ zj)j2J;￿) the vector of characteristics, including the unobserved one. The tax (or subsidy, if negative)
equals
￿ = y ￿ c = t0 + t ￿ x: (17)
Equations (16)-(17) directly suggest a simple two-step approach to estimate the tax rates t0 and t. First,
estimate equation (16) by OLS, which provides us with a prediction b x = ((b wj ￿ zj)j2J;b ￿). Second, estimate
equation (17) by OLS, replacing x by b x and correcting the standard errors for these added regressors
(Maddala, 2001, p360).
3.2 Data
We use the 2007 EU-SILC data (European Union - Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), whose
aim is to collect harmonized and comparable multidimensional micro data on income poverty and social
exclusion for 24 EU member states (all 2006 EU member states, except Malta) as well as Norway and
Iceland. Our analysis is based on the 2007 EU-SILC wave, which is the ￿rst to include gross income
information for all countries. The sample size varies from 3,505 households in Cyprus to 20,982 households
in Italy.14 In the remainder we sometimes classify countries in groups and talk about the Continental,15
the Northern,16 the Southern,17 the Anglo-Saxon,18 the Central Eastern,19 and the Baltic20 countries.
In addition to the EU-SILC, we use data from IPUMS-CPS (King et al., 2010) which is an integrated
dataset of the March Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly US household survey
conducted jointly by the US Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our analysis is based on
the 2007 wave and the variable values and de￿nitions are adapted to follow the EU-SILC standard. We
provide a de￿nition of the income components and summary statistics in the data appendix.21
We select single and couple households with or without children. In our preferred speci￿cation we
estimate a joint model on the pooled data. As a robustness check, we will conduct separate estimations
for singles and couples; see appendix. We also trim the top and bottom 1% of the income distribution
in order to avoid estimation problems due to extreme outliers. Since needs (e.g., the number of children)
14The survey is representative for the whole population in each country due to the construction of population weights.
15Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Luxembourg (LU) and the Netherlands (NL).
16Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Iceland (IS), Sweden (SE), and Norway (NO).
17Cyprus (CY), Spain (ES), Greece (GR), Italy (IT) and Portugal (PT).
18Ireland (IE), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).
19The Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Slovenia (SI) and the Slovak Republic (SK).
20Estonia (EE), Lithuania (LT) and Latvia (LV).
21See also Fuest et al. (2010) for more details.
11are a crucial determinant of existing tax-bene￿t systems, we use equivalent gross household income as our
preferred outcome measure; again, robustness checks will be provided in the appendix. To make incomes
comparable across countries, we adjust national income amounts by the multilateral current purchasing
power parities provided by Eurostat. The analysis only allocates those taxes and bene￿ts that can be
reasonably attributed to households. Therefore, corporate taxes as well as some types of government
expenditures, such as expenditure on defense, are not considered. Due to data limitations, indirect taxes
and in-kind bene￿ts cannot be taken into account either. Thus, in the remainder we merely focus on cash
bene￿ts when speaking of social bene￿ts and on personal income taxes in the case of taxes.
We construct the following characteristics. The characteristic ￿ sex￿contains a gender dummy, ￿ age￿
contains several dummies for di⁄erent age classes, ￿ disability￿is constructed using information on disability
status and the receipt of certain disability bene￿ts, ￿ foreign￿contains two dummies for born outside of
the country but within the EU and born outside the EU. The covariates for the characteristic ￿ education￿
simply consist of di⁄erent education dummies (4 levels according to the ISCED de￿nition), ￿ needs￿contains
information about the number of children (in three age groups) together with the number of additional
adults, ￿ couple￿is a dummy for living as a couple, and ￿ unemployed￿contains a dummy for not working. In
our preferred speci￿cation, we use individual level covariates and characteristics, but again, as a robustness
check, we will also perform and report the estimations on the household level in the appendix (using
averages of the individual covariates of the head of the household and, eventually, his or her partner).
3.3 Results
We start with estimating the implicit tax rates for the di⁄erent determinants of outcomes. Although our
theory reveals little about the levels of compensation, the answer to the question how much countries
compensate for the e⁄ect of di⁄erent characteristics is, we believe, interesting in its own right. Afterwards,
we return to the theory and derive and test two hypotheses: do countries compensate more for non-
controllable characteristics compared to (partially) controllable ones and is the total e⁄ect of the non-
controllable characteristics equal to zero?
3.3.1 How much do we compensate for di⁄erent characteristics?
We estimate the implicit tax rates for each characteristic (i.e., ￿ age￿ , ￿ sex￿ , ￿ disability￿ , ￿ couple￿ , ￿ needs￿ ,
￿ foreign￿ , ￿ unemployed￿ , and ￿ education￿ ) separately.22 Recall that we use a two-step estimation procedure
based on (16)-(17) to estimate the implicit tax rates. The implicit tax rate for a characteristic that consists
of a single dummy only is equal to ￿￿=￿y, with ￿￿ the e⁄ect of the dummy on the tax paid (or subsidy
received) in the second step and ￿y the e⁄ect of the dummy on the gross outcome in the ￿rst step. As
a consequence, the implicit tax rate can become very unstable if the ￿rst step estimate of ￿y is close to
zero. Therefore, Table (1) only reports estimates for the implicit tax rates of those characteristics which
were signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in the ￿rst step of the estimation procedure; the complete ￿rst- and
second-step regression results are reported in the appendix.
We order characteristics (the columns of Table 1) on the basis of the average implicit tax rate over the
di⁄erent countries (reported in the last row), while we order countries (the rows of Table 1) on the basis of
their average implicit tax rate over the di⁄erent characteristics (reported in the last column). First, we see
22Note that we do not include the implicit tax rate for the unobserved part. Since the unobserved part is independent of
the other characteristics by assumption, its implicit tax rate is always close to the overall tax rate.
12Table 1: Implicit tax rates for di⁄erent characteristics in di⁄erent countries
AGE DIS UNEMP NEEDS IMMI EDUC SEX COUPLE Mean
CY 0.71 0.63 0.41 0.05 0.29 0.10 0.16 -0.01 0.31
US 0.70 0.54 0.60 0.14 -0.10 0.24 0.41 0.15 0.34
GR 0.83 0.87 0.38 0.05 0.27 0.46 0.54 -0.60 0.38
PT 0.97 0.56 0.63 0.20 -0.88 0.54 0.38
PL 0.98 0.58 0.43 0.14 0.27 0.24 -0.04 0.39
LV 0.65 0.62 0.35 0.55 0.29 0.40 0.20 0.12 0.40
IT 0.89 0.89 0.40 0.32 0.32 0.27 -0.40 0.38 0.40
LT 0.74 0.70 0.35 0.49 0.38 -0.04 0.12 0.41
IE 0.71 0.57 0.51 0.44 0.36 0.30 0.26 0.35 0.45
EE 0.73 0.57 0.39 0.56 0.27 0.44 0.50 0.12 0.45
ES 0.79 0.82 0.47 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.53 0.47
AT 0.92 0.78 0.62 0.53 0.16 0.21 0.51 0.30 0.51
LU 0.99 0.82 0.53 0.54 0.05 0.37 0.31 0.52
SI 0.90 0.78 0.53 0.47 0.50 0.41 0.71 -0.31 0.52
UK 0.74 0.75 0.53 0.49 0.41 0.31 0.51 0.45 0.52
SK 0.80 0.73 0.46 0.44 0.89 0.35 -0.01 0.53
NO 0.76 0.86 0.54 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.54 0.21 0.53
DE 0.84 0.76 0.64 0.54 0.77 0.30 0.08 0.32 0.54
IS 0.74 0.86 0.75 0.37 0.36 0.48 0.29 0.54
FR 1.01 0.90 0.67 0.51 0.26 0.34 0.16 0.39 0.54
CZ 0.80 0.82 0.58 0.53 0.44 0.53 0.06 0.54
HU 0.93 0.73 0.50 0.65 0.40 0.13 0.57
FI 0.79 0.86 0.65 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.61 0.31 0.58
BE 0.85 0.79 0.75 0.58 0.48 0.39 0.52 0.37 0.60
SE 0.79 0.85 0.66 0.45 0.56 0.58 0.30 0.61
DK 0.78 0.95 0.74 0.40 0.57 0.50 0.58 0.40 0.62
NL 0.88 0.80 0.75 0.51 0.47 0.53 0.66
Mean 0.82 0.76 0.55 0.42 0.38 0.36 0.29 0.21 0.49
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and IPUMS-CPS and IPUMS-CPS.
that some countries tend to compensate at a higher level compared to others. Generally speaking, we ￿nd
the Southern and Anglo-Saxon countries as well as the Baltic states at lower levels of compensation and
the Continental, Central Eastern and Northern countries at higher levels. Second, we ￿nd the following
order of compensation for the di⁄erent characteristics: there is most support for the elderly, followed by
the disabled, the unemployed and families with children, less support towards foreigners and the educated,
and ￿nally, least to women and singles.23 This revealed order of compensation is, generally speaking, in
line with sociological research on attitudes on social spending, where the typical order of deservingness is
old people, the sick and disabled, needy families with children, and the unemployed; see the seminal work
of Coughlin (1980).
23In the appendix we discuss the robustness of this order of solidarity w.r.t. the empirical speci￿cation.
133.3.2 Back to theory
The novelty of the theoretical part is the introduction of partial control. Although we do not observe the
precise degree of control in reality, the least we can say is whether some characteristics are beyond control
or not. To proceed, we partition the set of observable characteristics J into a set of characteristics with
no control (N) and a set with partial control (P). For the ￿ no control￿composite we choose the covariates
underlying the characteristics ￿ age￿ , ￿ sex￿ , and ￿ disability￿ , whereas the ￿ partial control￿composite contains
￿ couple￿ , ￿ needs￿ , ￿ foreign￿ , ￿ unemployed￿ , and ￿ education￿ .24 We keep the residual error term, labelled
￿ unobserved￿ , as a separate independent characteristic.25 We can use equation (16) again, with x now
decomposed as (xN;xP;xU) =
￿P
j2N wj ￿ zj;
P
j2P wj ￿ zj;￿
￿
.
In the current setting equation (15) reduces to




NN) ￿ (1 ￿ tP) = 0: (18)
We derive two hypotheses from it. A ￿rst weak hypothesis deals with the order of taxation, more precisely,
under what condition should the non-controllable characteristics be taxed more compared to the partially
controllable ones?




NN T ￿1, then tN T tP.
The if-condition can be tested in a straightforward way: the OLS-estimate of b in the regression
xP = a + bxN + ￿ (19)




NN. Next, we de￿ne




NN) ￿ (1 ￿ tP) (20)
as a fairness measure: it is the total marginal e⁄ect of the non-controllable characteristics on the net
outcome. The closer to zero, the fairer the tax-bene￿t system is. The following stronger hypothesis deals
with the fairness of tax-bene￿t systems in di⁄erent countries and follows directly from (18):
Strong hypothesis: FM = 0.
But how can we estimate FM? The net outcome c equals
c = (￿0 ￿ t0) + (1 ￿ tP)xP + (1 ￿ tN)xN + (1 ￿ tU)xU: (21)





c = (￿0 ￿ t0) + (1 ￿ tP)(a + bxN + ￿) + (1 ￿ tN)xN + (1 ￿ tU)xU













xN + (1 ￿ tU)xU + (1 ￿ tP)￿: (22)
24The assignment of ￿ foreigner￿ and ￿ disability￿ to either category can be disputed. Our choice can be justi￿ed in the
following way: We do not observe whether it was an individual￿ s choice to move to a foreign country or not. Hence, we
consider this characteristic as (potentially) partial controllable. For disability status, we try to focus on inborn handicaps
which are beyond individual control. However, our main results remain una⁄ected when altering these choices.
25Neither the theoretical results nor the empirics change. First, if we add a third characteristic to our theoretical model
with an underlying taste and type distribution which is pairwise independent of the underlying tastes and types of the other
characteristics, then the theoretical relation between the ￿rst two remains unchanged. Second, one could think of adding the
error term to either the ￿ no control￿or ￿ partial control￿composite, but, again due to its independence, this does not change
the empirical results.
14Equation (22) provides us with a two-step procedure: ￿rst, estimate equation (16) as before by OLS, which
provides us with b x = (b xN; b xP; b xU); second, estimate equation (22) by plugging in the estimated (b xN; b xU),
which provides us with an estimate d FM as well as a con￿dence interval (again we correct standard errors
for the added regressors).
3.3.3 Does compensation depend on the degree of control?




NN as well as the




NN < ￿1. The null is rejected for each country. As a consequence, hypothesis 1
predicts that tN ￿ tP should hold, or the implicit tax rate for the no-control composite should be larger
than the one for the partial control composite in each country.
To check whether this prediction is true, Figure 2 shows the implicit tax rates for all countries for the
￿ no control￿and the ￿ partial control￿composite along with the 95% con￿dence bands. Countries are ordered
on the basis of the overall tax rate.26 Countries with higher overall tax rates also tend to compensate more
for both composites, but the link is far from perfect: Luxembourg, Portugal and Poland have moderate
overall tax rates, but among the highest implicit tax rates for characteristics beyond control.














































Overall Partial No Control
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and IPUMS-CPS
26Note that the overall tax rate is an imperfect indicator of the degree of redistribution in a country. In a regression of
taxes on gross incomes, the constant plays a role as well. For example, Luxembourg has a moderate overall tax rate, but a
large (negative) constant such that it probably belongs to the group of highly redistributive countries.
15In line with the theoretical part, the implicit tax rate on (partially) controllable factors is always
signi￿cantly below the tax rate for non-controllable factors in all countries. On average, we obtain a tax
rate equal to 0:80 and 0:40 for non-controllable and partially controllable characteristics, respectively. We
show in the appendix that this result is very robust with respect to the chosen empirical speci￿cation.
As can be seen in Table (1), this result also holds if we compare the non-controllable characteristics
age and disability separately with each of the partially controllable ones. Still, it would not hold for
the characteristic sex in some countries. If we look at the dispersion in the implicit tax rates for the
characteristic sex in the di⁄erent countries, it turns out to be the most disputed characteristic.
In order to better understand the role played by taxes, contributions and bene￿ts separately, we
decompose the total tax amount in equation (17) as
￿ = y ￿ c = ￿y + ￿ss ￿ b; (23)
with ￿y (equivalized) income taxes, ￿c (equivalized) social security contributions and b (equivalized) ben-
e￿ts (and tax credits). We can do the second step estimation separately for each component, i.e.,
￿y = ty;0 + ty ￿ x , ￿ss = tss;0 + tss ￿ x , and ￿ b = tb;0 + tb ￿ x; (24)
again with x = (xN;xP;xU). We obtain
￿ = (ty;0 + tss;0 + tb;0) + (ty + tss + tb) ￿ x;
with t = ty +tss +tb a vector of tax rates, one rate for each composite characteristic in x = (xN;xP;xU),
which can now be decomposed over income taxes, social security contributions and bene￿ts. The estimated
tax rates for ty, tss and tb, expressed as shares of the overall tax rate t, are reported in Figure 3 for ￿ no
control￿(upper panel) and ￿ partial control￿(lower panel); countries are again sorted on the basis of their
overall tax rate.
Not surprisingly, bene￿ts tend to be relatively more important compared to taxes in the compensation
for non-controllable characteristics. Still, half of the compensation for non-controllable characteristics is
due to taxes, e.g., because earnings, and thus also taxes in a progressive tax scheme, tend to increase
with age. In the ￿ partial control￿ -case, taxes have the highest relative importance in all countries. Both
cases together indicate that bene￿ts are mainly used to compensate for non-controllable factors whereas
taxes are mainly used for compensating the non-controllable part in partially controllable characteristics.
In the appendix we provide the same decomposition for each characteristic separately. If we look at the
non-controllable factors (age, disability and sex), this ￿gure con￿rms that pensions and disability bene￿ts
play a big role in compensating the income e⁄ect of age and disability, while progressive taxes tend to
compensate for sex.
3.3.4 How fair are tax-bene￿t systems?
To test the stronger hypothesis, the point estimates and con￿dence intervals for the fairness measure FM
de￿ned in (20) are plotted in Figure 4 for each country. A value of this ￿ fairness measure￿greater than
zero implies that the compensation for the ￿ no control￿characteristics is too low relative to the ￿ partial
control￿composite and vice-versa. The greater the distance from zero, the less fair a country.
Generally speaking, the ￿gure shows three chains of countries: a ￿rst group with a fair tax-bene￿t system
(or close to it), with values for the fairness measure between 0 and 0.1, a large intermediate group around




















































































































































Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and IPUMS-CPS
0.1 and 0.3, and a group of four countries which is further away from the fairness ideal, roughly in between
0.35 and 0.45. In the appendix we show that the empirical speci￿cation does not matter for the ranking of
the countries (although the numbers can be di⁄erent, especially when using income rather than equivalent
income).
In contrast with the weak hypothesis, the strong hypothesis can be rejected for all countries except
France and Luxembourg. France and Luxembourg have a high implicit tax rate for non-controllable char-
acteristics in common, but clearly note that their overall tax rate is not necessarily high compared to other
countries. Note also that some other Continental countries (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) as























































Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and IPUMS-CPS.
well as Hungary and Poland come close to being fair. If we only look at the countries with a good perfor-
mance, the degree of compensation for the non-controllable characteristics seems to be the crucial factor.
We also know that age is by far the most important factor among the non-controllable ones; note, for in-
stance, that the variation of the non-controllable composite due to age accounts on average for more than
80% of the explained variation. This might also explain why the Northern countries (Sweden, Denmark,
Norway, Finland and Iceland), with a moderate to low public spending on public Pensions, can be found
among the worst performers in the intermediate group (see OECD, 2009). More generally, it begs the
question whether the second- and third-pillar contributions and bene￿ts should also be taken up in the
output de￿nition.27
The way to improve fairness can be rather di⁄erent in di⁄erent countries. Recall equation (20) and
Figure (4). To improve fairness, all countries must lower FM, the total e⁄ect that the non-controllable
characteristics have on net outcome. According to the decomposition in Figure (3) they can do so by
changing the bene￿ts (which mainly impacts tN) and by changing (the progressivity of) income taxes
(which changes tP and tN). For the worst performing countries (Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia and the United




NN is positive and, as a consequence, tN and/or tP should be lowered. The
fairness gains of increasing (the progressivity of) income taxes are triple. It directly increases tN and tP,
and, if additional tax revenues result, bene￿ts can also be raised to further increase tN. The positive
27The second-pillar variables are missing for all countries. The third-pillar data are present but di¢ cult to introduce, since





NN is also true for some of the Southern countries (Spain, Greece and Portugal), but the





is negative. Figure 3 suggests that changing (the progressivity of) income taxes has a bigger impact on
tP compared to tN. Therefore, lowering (the progressivity of) income taxes could be helpful to improve
fairness in these countries.
4 Conclusion
There is ample evidence from surveys and experiments that fairness plays a role in redistributive issues.
Individuals want to compensate others for their misfortune, while they allow them to enjoy the fruits of
their e⁄ort. Such fairness considerations have been introduced in political economy and optimal income
tax models. We introduce fairness as a device to select among e¢ cient tax-bene￿t schemes that are based
on several characteristics. In addition, we introduce partial control: characteristics di⁄er in the degree of
control, i.e., the extent to which they can be changed by exerting e⁄ort. We derive two testable predictions.
The tax rate on partially controllable characteristics should be lower compared to the tax rate on non-
controllable characteristics, and the total e⁄ect of non-controllable characteristics on the post-tax outcome
should be equal to zero.
We estimate implicit tax rates for a set of characteristics in 26 European countries (using the 2007
EU-SILC data) and the US (using the CPS data). We ￿nd a robust tendency in all countries to com-
pensate more for the uncontrollable composite characteristic (based on sex, age and disability) compared
to the partially controllable one (based on family composition, immigration status, unemployment and
education level). We also estimate the total e⁄ect of the non-controllable composite on the post-tax out-
come and test whether it is equal to zero. Only France and Luxembourg pass the fairness test. Although
this result is sensitive to the empirical speci￿cation, the ranking of countries in terms of fairness tends
to be robust. The way in which countries can improve fairness depends on the variance-covariance struc-
ture of the characteristics. For the worst performing countries (Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia and the United
States), the analysis suggests that increasing (the progressivity of) income taxes could increase fairness
considerably. For most of the other countries, the opposite is probably true. One caveat applies. Age is
an important factor in the non-controllable composite. Since we can only include ￿rst-pillar pensions, the
fairness measure is biased to the advantage of the (continental) countries with a generous public pension
scheme.
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dF (￿)dG(￿) ￿ R0;
and well-being of an individual v (t0;t;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿) is de￿ned as










j2J (1 ￿ ￿j)￿j
;
with ￿(t0;t;￿;￿0;￿;￿) ￿ ￿(R0;0;￿;￿0;￿;￿) equal to







































+ (1 ￿ ￿j)￿j:
Before analyzing the solution, notice that the optimal tax rates t￿ must satisfy t￿ ￿ ￿. As de￿ned before,
x￿
j remains the same for all tax levels tj ￿ ￿j, so it su¢ ces for the planner to look at tax rates tj < ￿j
and tj = ￿j. In addition, a solution with t￿
j = ￿j (and t0 ! +1) can never be e¢ cient (the laisser faire
is better for everyone), leaving us with tj < ￿j for each j in J, as required.
First, e¢ ciency requires that the budget constraint is satis￿ed with equality. Given independent
(multivariate normal) distributions for ￿ and ￿, we simply get
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k (￿k ￿ tk)(1 ￿ ￿k)￿￿
kj
￿P
k2J (1 ￿ ￿k)￿k
￿2 :
Putting everything together (and multiplying by ￿
2 :=
￿P
k2J (1 ￿ ￿k)￿k
￿2








kj + r(1 ￿ ￿j)
P
k (￿k ￿ tk)(1 ￿ ￿k)￿￿
kj = 0;
for each j in J.
Finally, to establish concavity, we directly focus on the case of two characteristics; the case of one
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k2 + r(1 ￿ ￿2)
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k (￿k ￿ tk)(1 ￿ ￿k)￿￿
k2 = 0:











11 ￿ r(1 ￿ ￿1)
2 ￿￿
11;
￿12 = ￿21 = ￿r￿1￿1￿2￿2￿
￿








22 ￿ r(1 ￿ ￿2)
2 ￿￿
22:
To show that the Hessian matrix is negative semi-de￿nite, we must have ￿11 ￿ 0, ￿22 ￿ 0 (which are
true) and j￿j = ￿11￿22 ￿ (￿12)
2 ￿ 0. To show that j￿j = ￿11￿22 ￿ (￿12)
2 ￿ 0, note that the term
￿11￿22 does not depend on the covariances and that ￿12 does not depend on ￿; therefore the worst-case














2) and ￿ ! 0














































which is non-negative, as required.
A multiplicative model
We outline a multiplicative (i.e., log-linear) variant of our model and show that the resulting optimal tax
formula remains the same. We stick to the same notation as in the main text.
Production technology. The pre-intervention or gross outcome is denoted y and is assumed to be a
log-linear function of the di⁄erent characteristics of the individual; formally:
lny = ln￿0 +
P
j2J ￿j lnxj;




j2J ￿ 0. Characteristics are a combination of e⁄ort e 2 RJ and type ￿ 2 RJ in
a multiplicative Cobb-Douglas way, i.e., for each j in J we assume
lnxj = ￿j lnej + (1 ￿ ￿j)ln￿j:
The weights of e⁄ort￿ one weight for each characteristic￿ de￿ne the ￿ degree of control￿for each character-
istic. The multiplicative Mirrlees model can be obtained by choosing jJj = 1; ￿0 = 1; ￿1 = 2 and ￿1 = 1=2
which leads to y = ￿1e1. Choosing jJj = 2; ￿0 = 1; ￿1 = 2, ￿1 = 1=2 and ￿2 = 0, the multiplicative
version of Akerlof￿ s model equals y = (￿1e1)=(￿2)
￿2 where (￿2)
￿2 is a relative equivalence scale factor
that adjusts income ￿1e1 for needs (in case ￿2 6= 0).
Preference technology. We assume quasi-loglinear preferences, or:








with ￿ 2 RJ
++ a vector of taste parameters which de￿nes the disutility of e⁄ort, and ￿ 2 RJ
++ a vector
controlling the degree of convexity of the cost of e⁄ort.
Net outcomes and behaviour. The instruments of the social planner are restricted to log-linear schemes:
net outcome c satis￿es
lnc ￿ lny ￿ t0 ￿
P
j2J tj lnxj;
with t0 controlling the overall level of the net outcome, and t 2 RJ the tax rates applied to the di⁄erent









￿￿j for all j in J,
or, equivalently,
lne￿




+ ￿j ln￿j for all j in J.










+ (1 ￿ ￿j)ln￿j; (25)
and the (logarithm of the) corresponding indirect utility V (t0;t;￿;￿0;￿;￿;￿;￿) equals











































j2J a vector of means and ￿ = (￿ij)ij2J2 a variance-covariance matrix with ￿jj > 0 for
all j in J. The social planner sets taxes t0 and t to maximize an iso-elastic (Kolm-Atkinson-Sen) concave








subject to a (logarithmic) budget constraint28
R R
(lny￿ ￿ lnc￿)dF (￿)dG(￿) ￿ R0:
Indirect well-being v is again de￿ned as a speci￿c cardinalization of indirect utility, i.e.,
V (t0;t;￿;￿0;￿;￿;￿;￿) = V (R0;0;￿;￿0;￿;￿;￿;(v;v;:::;v));
which leads to lnv (t0;t;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿) being equal to
￿(t0;t;￿;￿0;￿;￿) ￿ ￿(R0;0;￿;￿0;￿;￿) ￿
P








j2J ￿j (1 ￿ ￿j)
:
Givne e¢ ciency, the budget constraint must hold with equality, which allows us to derive t0 as
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and using the expression for ￿￿ in lnv the problem reduces to
max
t A + B + C;
28Although somewhat arti￿cial￿ R0 does not have a money interpretation￿ , higher values for R0 still corresponds to a
higher government requirement. In addition, note that lny￿ ￿ lnc￿ ￿ (y￿ ￿ c￿)=c￿, so R0 can be interpreted as a minimal
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Taking partial derivatives (and de￿ning ￿ :=
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adding up and multiplying with ￿








kj + r(1 ￿ ￿j)
P
k (￿k ￿ tk)(1 ￿ ￿k)￿ln￿
kj = 0;
for each j in J, as in Proposition 1.
The Mirrlees-case
In case of one characteristic and ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = 1, we get
￿￿1￿1





11 + r(1 ￿ ￿1)
2 (1 ￿ t1)￿￿
11 = 0: (26)
Point 1. The optimal tax rate t￿
1 on earnings x1 lies in between the extremes of no taxation and complete
taxation, i.e., 0 < t￿
1 < 1:
We know from proposition 1 that t￿
1 < 1. In addition, also t￿
1 > 0 must hold, since t1 ￿ 0 cannot satisfy
the ￿rst-order condition.
Point 2. The optimal tax rate t￿
1 on earnings x1 decreases with the elasticity ￿1 from complete taxation if
the elasticity approaches zero (t￿
1 ! 1 if ￿1 ! 0) to no taxation if the elasticity becomes very high (t￿
1 ! 0
if ￿1 ! +1).
If ￿1 ! 0, the ￿rst-order condition reduces to
r(1 ￿ ￿1)
2 (1 ￿ t1)￿￿
11 = 0;
which is satis￿ed for t1 ! 1. If ￿1 ! +1, the ￿rst-order condition reduces to (divide by (￿1)
2 > 0 and
































given 0 < t1 < 1.
Point 3. The optimal tax rate t￿
1 on earnings x1 increases with the inequality aversion parameter r from
no taxation if the planner is inequality neutral (t￿











if r ! +1).




(1 ￿ ￿1) = 0;




11 + (1 ￿ ￿1)
2 (1 ￿ t1)￿￿
11 = 0;

























11 + (1 ￿ ￿1)
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1￿t1 (1 ￿ ￿1)












which is positive, given 0 < t1 < 1.
Point 4. The optimal tax rate t￿
1 on earnings x1 increases with type heterogeneity ￿￿
11 from no taxation if
everyone has the same type (t￿
1 ! 0 if ￿￿
11 ! 0) to complete taxation if types become very heterogeneous
(t￿
1 ! 1 if ￿￿
11 ! +1).
If ￿￿








which is satis￿ed for t1 ! 0. If ￿￿
11 ! +1, the ￿rst-order condition reduces to (divide by ￿￿
11 > 0 and
consider the limiting case ￿￿
11 ! +1)
r(1 ￿ ￿1)
2 (1 ￿ t1) = 0;












2 (1 ￿ t1)












28given 0 < t1 < 1.
Point 5. The optimal tax rate t￿
1 on earnings x1 decreases with taste heterogeneity ￿
￿
11 from some taxation
if everyone has the same taste (0 < t￿
1 < 1 if ￿
￿
11 ! 0) to zero taxation if tastes become very heterogeneous
(t￿
1 ! 0 if ￿
￿
11 ! +1).
If there is no taste heterogeneity (￿
￿




(1 ￿ ￿1) + r(1 ￿ ￿1)
2 (1 ￿ t1)￿￿
11 = 0;
which can lead to any tax rate satisfying 0 < t￿
1 < 1. The other case (￿
￿
11 ! +1) leads to (divide by
￿
￿




































given 0 < t1 < 1.
Point 6. The optimal tax rate t￿
1 on earnings x1 decreases with the degree of control ￿1 from complete
taxation if earnings cannot be controlled (t￿
1 ! 1 if ￿1 ! 0) to no taxation if income is fully controlled
(t￿
1 ! 0 if ￿1 ! 1).
If ￿1 ! 0, the ￿rst-order condition reduces to
r(1 ￿ ￿1)
2 (1 ￿ t1)￿￿
11 = 0;
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which is negative, given point 1 (0 < t1 < 1).
29The Akerlof-case








11 + r(1 ￿ ￿1)
￿
(1 ￿ t1)(1 ￿ ￿1)￿￿




(1 ￿ t1)(1 ￿ ￿1)￿￿
12 + (￿2 ￿ t2)￿￿
22 = 0;
with ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿1) + ￿2. The second of the ￿rst-order conditions can be rewritten as





























11 + r(1 ￿ ￿1)









The latter equation does not depend on t2 and therefore completely describes the solution for t1, which


















Point 1. From proposition 1, we already know that t1 < 1 in the optimum, and it is easy to verify that
t1 < 0 cannot satisfy equation (28). To summarize, we must have 0 < t1 < 1. As a consequence, we also
have t2 T ￿2 if ￿￿
12 T 0.
Point 2. The tax rate on earnings t￿
1 decreases with the degree of control ￿1, ranging from full taxation
if earnings cannot be controlled (t￿
1 ! 1 if ￿1 ! 0) to no taxation if income is fully controlled (t￿
1 ! 0
if ￿1 ! 1); the tag is fully taxed, both if there is no control over earnings and if there is full control
over earnings (t￿
2 ! ￿2, if either ￿1 ! 0 or ￿1 ! 1), but the change is unde￿ned in general. We only
know that, at ￿1 ! 0, the tax rate t￿
2 increases (resp. decreases) with ￿1 if the type correlation is positive
(resp. negative) and vice-versa at ￿1 ! 1.




































1￿t1 (1 ￿ 2￿1 + ￿2) ￿ 2r￿1 (￿1)
2 t1￿
￿
































22) depend on (and thus move with) changes in ￿￿
11 and ￿￿
22, which
could complicate the comparative statics. This is not true for the constraints on ￿￿
12 (i.e., ￿1 ￿ ￿￿
12 ￿ 1).
30We can divide both sides by ￿1￿ = ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2) > 0 and using the ￿rst-order condition to replace
￿￿1￿1
￿t1





































































d￿1 is positive (resp. negative) if the type covariance/correlation is positive (resp. negative), while at








which leads to the opposite sign.
Point 3. The tax rate on earnings t￿
1 decreases with the cost of taxation ￿1, ranging from t1 ! 1 (if
￿1 ! 0) to t1 ! 0 (if ￿1 ! +1). The tax rate t￿
2 on the tag increases (resp. decreases) with the
earnings elasticity ￿1if the type correlation is positive (resp. negative), ranging from t2 = ￿2 (if ￿1 ! 0)







(1 ￿ ￿1) (if ￿1 ! +1).




































































the sign of which corresponds with the sign of the correlation.
Point 4. The tax rate on earnings t￿
1 increases with the type heterogeneity ￿￿
11 for earnings, from t1 ! 0
to t1 ! 1; the tax rate on the tag t￿
2 equals ￿2 if there is no type heterogeneity ￿￿
11 for earnings, while the
comparative statics are unde￿ned.
If ￿￿






22 adjusts to 0, leaving ￿￿









which leads to t1 ! 0 and t2 ! ￿2. If ￿￿
11 ! +1, then condition (28) reduces to
r(1 ￿ ￿1)








31which implies t1 ! 1 and t2 unde￿ned (since both ￿￿
11 ! +1 and 1 ￿ t1 ! 0). The comparative statics
for t￿
1 w.r.t. ￿￿



































































the sign of which is not de￿ned.
Point 5. The tax rate on earnings t￿
1 does not change with ￿￿
22. The tax rate on the tag t￿
2 increases
(resp. decreases) with ￿￿
22 if the type correlation is negative (resp. positive).
Condition (28) does not change with ￿￿
22, indicating that t￿







The tax rate on the tag increases (resp. decreases) with ￿￿
22 if the correlation is negative (resp. positive),


























(1 ￿ t1)(1 ￿ ￿1);
the sign of which is the opposite to the sign of the type correlation ￿￿
12.
Point 6. The tax rate on earnings t￿
1 increases with ￿￿
12 if ￿￿
12 is negative, and t￿
1 decreases with ￿￿
12 if ￿￿
12





= 1) the same tax rate t￿
1 = 0 on earnings applies; the tax rate on the
tag t￿













At the extremes (￿￿
































the sign of which is inversely related to ￿￿




















































Point 7. The tax rate on earnings t￿
1 and the tax rate on the tag t￿





decreases with taste heterogeneity for earnings ￿
￿
11; the tax rate for the tag t￿
2 increases (resp. decreases
in case ￿￿
12 < 0) with ￿
￿
















+ r(1 ￿ ￿1)









which does not give a clear prescription. If ￿
￿
11 ! +1, then condition (28) reduces to
￿r(￿1￿1)
2 t1 = 0;






























































the sign of which is the same as the sign of ￿￿
12.
Point 8. The tax rate on earnings t￿











































2￿ if the correlation is positive (resp. neg-
ative).



































































11 + (1 ￿ ￿1)






































































the sign of which is the same as the sign of ￿￿
12.
34Data
1. Pre-tax household income is the sum (at household level) of the remuneration of labour (earnings)
and capital (rents), more precisely, the sum of
(a) (gross) employee cash or near cash income,
(b) (gross) non-cash employee income,30
(c) employer￿ s social insurance contributions,31
(d) (gross) cash bene￿ts or losses from self-employment,
(e) (gross) rental income,
(f) (gross) interest, dividends and pro￿t from capital investments in unincorporated business;
2. Post-tax household income is the pre-tax household income + the sum of (gross) bene￿ts - taxes
and social insurance contributions, more precisely, pre-tax household income
PLUS
(a) (gross) unemployment bene￿ts,
(b) (gross) old-age and survivor bene￿ts,
(c) (gross) sickness and disability bene￿ts,
(d) (gross) education-related allowances,
(e) (gross) child allowances,
(f) (gross) other bene￿ts (e.g., guaranteed minimum income),
MINUS
(a) employer￿ s social insurance contributions,
(b) tax on income (including taxes on holdings and tax reimbursements) and (employee￿ s) social
security contributions.
3. To obtain equivalent (pre- or post-tax) income, we divide (pre- or post-tax) income by the (modi￿ed)
OECD scale, i.e., 1 + 0:5 ￿ (# of additional adults (age ￿ 14)) + 0:3 ￿ (# of children (age < 14)).
30Imputed for the Netherlands on the basis of EU-SILC 2006 data.
31Imputed for Germany, Latvia and the UK.
35Table 2: Income concepts
Concept De￿nition / Imputation
Wages and
Salaries
Gross employee cash or near cash income (including e.g. holiday payments,
pay for overtime, bonuses etc.) plus non-cash employee income (e.g. company
car, free or subsidized meals etc.).
Self-employment
Income
Net operating pro￿t or loss accruing to working owners of, or partners in,
an unincorporated enterprise less interest on business loans; royalities earned
on writing and inventions as well as rentals from business buildings, vehicles,
equipment etc.
Capital Income Imputed rent; income from rental of a property or land; interest, dividends,
pro￿ts from capital investment in an unicorporated business; regular inter-




Payments made by the employers for the bene￿ts of their employees to in-
surers (social security funds and private funded schemes) covering statutory,
convential or contractual contributions in respect of insurance against social
risks. Information on the amount of social insurance contributions paid by
the employer is not reported for DE, LT and the UK. In these cases, we use
country-speci￿c legal rules to impute the SIC paid by the employer based on
the corresponding employee income.
Public Pensions Old-age bene￿ts (any replacement income when the aged person retires from the
labor market, care allowances etc.) and survivor·s bene￿ts (such as survivor·s
pension and death grants).
Cash Bene￿ts Unemployment bene￿ts, sickness bene￿ts, disability bene￿ts, education-related
allowances; family/children related allowances, housing allowances, bene￿ts for
social exclusion not elsewhere classi￿ed (periodic income support for people
with insu¢ cient resources and other related cash bene￿ts).
Income taxes Taxes on income, pro￿ts and capital gains, assessed on the actual or presumed
income of individuals, households or tax-units. EU-SILC only reports income
taxes and employee SIC as an aggregated value. We subtract imputed SIC to




Employer·s SIC (see above) and employees￿SIC (any contributions to either
mandatory government or employer-based social insurance schemes. EU-SILC
does not report SIC paid by the employee as a separate variable, therefore
values are imputed (see above) applying the appropriate legal rules of each
country.
36Table 3: Mean statistics for di⁄erent income-related concepts
number eq. scale gross eq. gross net eq. net tax eq. tax
AT 8318 1.6 34655.3 20082.0 32686.0 20071.6 1969.3 10.4
BE 8307 1.7 43194.0 24444.0 31959.1 18994.8 11234.8 5449.2
CY 4191 1.9 30744.1 15526.3 31246.0 16608.3 -502.0 -1082.0
CZ 12459 1.6 9913.8 5633.0 9199.8 5618.1 714.0 14.9
DE 19444 1.6 34776.2 20584.8 31769.7 19744.8 3006.5 840.1
DK 8527 1.7 69006.7 38351.4 48043.6 27608.0 20963.1 10743.5
EE 6029 1.7 9756.8 5291.7 8086.0 4592.2 1670.8 699.5
ES 13464 1.7 25064.6 13767.1 22414.1 13011.6 2650.4 755.5
FI 14432 1.7 49408.9 27486.2 38015.5 21884.7 11393.4 5601.4
FR 14213 1.7 37253.7 20769.3 32729.7 19363.9 4524.1 1405.3
GR 5348 1.7 24753.0 13443.0 19924.7 11647.9 4828.3 1795.1
HU 10162 1.7 6783.4 3809.9 6841.2 4155.9 -57.8 -345.9
IE 6536 1.6 37483.5 20709.8 40664.2 24115.0 -3180.8 -3405.2
IS 3838 1.8 83562.0 44325.9 60503.3 32887.2 23058.7 11438.7
IT 21976 1.7 31537.4 17788.4 27959.3 16886.4 3578.1 902.0
LT 5995 1.6 7197.7 4063.6 6105.5 3637.9 1092.2 425.7
LU 5297 1.7 62378.3 35747.7 57040.1 33279.6 5338.1 2468.0
LV 4721 1.6 5788.6 3386.9 5361.1 3294.6 427.5 92.3
NL 15263 1.7 54028.7 30428.4 37355.5 22039.3 16673.2 8389.1
NO 8534 1.7 66752.0 37481.4 55744.7 32251.8 11007.4 5229.7
PL 14184 1.7 7094.8 3769.7 7128.9 4165.5 -34.1 -395.8
PT 4345 1.7 17657.4 9640.8 16194.9 9546.4 1462.5 94.4
SE 10380 1.7 45325.4 25836.6 34950.6 20595.9 10374.8 5240.8
SI 8702 1.9 23314.9 11552.2 20117.4 10741.3 3197.5 810.8
SK 5153 1.8 7687.1 3975.4 7119.0 4024.9 568.2 -49.5
UK 12108 1.6 43820.4 25788.2 38768.2 23902.0 5052.2 1886.2
US 115650 1.8 59663.1 32526.2 52771.2 29425.9 6892.0 3100.3




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39Testing the if-condition of hypothesis 1





































Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and IPUMS-CPS.
40Decomposition for the di⁄erent implicit tax rates
























































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and IPUMS-CPS
41Robustness checks
The benchmark results are based on equivalent incomes, estimated at the individual level for singles and
couples together (while including a couple dummy). We think this is a good speci￿cation: needs are crucial
in all tax-bene￿t systems and individual estimations are standard practice. Still, it is possible to come up
with other speci￿cations, leading to 8 di⁄erent combinations (our preferred speci￿cation is highlighted in
italics):
￿ 2 output de￿nitions: income versus equivalent income,
￿ 2 estimation levels: purely individual versus household averages,
￿ 2 estimation methods: singles and couples separately versus joint estimation.
We look at the sensitivity of our results for these alternative speci￿cations. First, the order of solidarity
found in Table 1 is more or less robust. Table 8 reports the average tax rate for the di⁄erent characteristics
for the preferred speci￿cation (￿rst column) and three other possible speci￿cations.32 The estimation level
(individual or household level) does not induce big changes. However, if we change from equivalent income
(￿rst two columns) to income (last two columns), then the tax rate for needs goes down. And somewhat
more surprisingly, the compensation rate for sex increases. To summarize, only the outcome speci￿cation
could change the order of compensation, and only for the characteristics needs and sex. Next, Figure 7
shows that the di⁄erent speci￿cations do a⁄ect the implicit tax rates for the ￿ partial control￿and the
￿ no control￿composite both in the upper panel (joint estimation) and lower panel (separate estimation).
However, more important for our purposes is the fact that the tax rates for the ￿ no control￿composite
(the squares and triangles) always remain signi￿cantly higher than for the ￿ partial control￿characteristics
(the dots and diamonds) in each alternative speci￿cation. Finally, when looking at the fairness measure in
Figure 6, the main di⁄erence is again due to the choice of output de￿nition. When using income instead
of equivalent income, the value of the fairness measure is on average about 0.25 higher. As a consequence,
if we do not account for economies of scale within households, we must reject the hypothesis that there
exist countries with a fair tax bene￿t system. Still, the ranking of countries in terms of fairness turns out
to be robust, irrespective of the choices made.
32Note that separate estimation for singles and couples does not allow to estimate the tax rate for couple and is therefore
discarded here.
42Table 8: Mean implicit tax rates for di⁄erent characteristics and di⁄erent methods
eq. income income
ind hh ind hh
age 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.78
disability 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.74
unemployed 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
needs 0.42 0.43 0.20 0.23
immigration 0.38 0.34 0.41 0.41
education 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.39
sex 0.29 0.34 0.53 0.40
couple 0.21 0.09 0.11 0.15
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and IPUMS-CPS.























































ind, join, eq ind, join, inc hh, join, eq hh, join, inc
ind, sing, eq ind, coup, eq ind, sing, inc ind, coup, inc
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and IPUMS-CPS. Notes: ￿ hh￿(￿ in￿ ) indicates the output level:
household (individual), ￿ join￿(￿ sing￿ / ￿ coup￿ ) the estimation method: joint (single/couple) and ￿ inc￿(￿ eq￿ ) the
output concept: (equivalent) income.














































N-in-join-eq N-in-join-inc N-hh-join-eq N-hh-join-inc














































N-in-sing-eq N-in-coup-eq N-in-sing-inc N-in-coup-inc
N-hh-sing-eq N-hh-coup-eq N-hh-sing-inc N-hh-coup-inc
P-in-sing-eq P-in-coup-eq P-in-sing-inc P-in-coup-inc
P-hh-sing-eq P-hh-coup-eq P-hh-sing-inc P-hh-coup-inc
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and IPUMS-CPS. Notes: ￿ P￿(￿ N￿ ) indicates the implicit tax rate for
partial (no) control, ￿ hh￿(￿ in￿ ) the output level: household (individual), ￿ join￿(￿ sing￿ /￿ coup￿ ) the estimation
method: joint (single/couple) and ￿ inc￿(￿ eq￿ ) the output concept: (equivalent) income.
44